NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 11 | Number 1

Article 21

12-1-1932

Taxation -- Copyright Royalties as Immune From
State Taxation
E. M. Perkins

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
E. M. Perkins, Taxation -- Copyright Royalties as Immune From State Taxation, 11 N.C. L. Rev. 110 (1932).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol11/iss1/21

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Taxation-Copyright Royalties as Immune From State
Taxation.
In Maxwell v. Chemical Construction Co., 1 decided in March
1931, the North Carolina Supreme Court held unconstitutional a tax
on income derived from royalties on patents issued by the United
States. Identically the same form of tax had been declared invalid
by the United States Supreme Court three years earlier in Long v.
Rockwood, 2 and the North Carolina court considered that decisiori
controlling. On May 16, 1932, the United States Supreme Court
decided Fox Film Corporationv. Doyal,3 upholding a Georgia privilege tax measured by gross receipts, which in the contested case
were royalties from copyrights. Their decision in Long v. Rockwood having been urged upon the court, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
agreed that in this question copyrights and patents stood in the same
position and remarked that, "the affirmance of the judgment in the
instant case cannot be reconciled with the decision in Long v. Rockwood-and in view of the conclusions now reached upon a re'4
examination of the question, that case is definitely overruled."
Thus comes to an early end a generally criticized 5 extension of the
doctrine, long established, that state and federal governmental instrumentalities-are free from taxation by the other government. Mr.
Justice Holmes' dissent in Long v.Rockwood contained the theory
1200 N. C. 500, 157 S. E. 606 (1931). (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 475. The
income of the company for 1929 was assessed at $134,341.96, and upon this
sum, receiyed from royalties, was levied a tax amounting to $6,907.76. The
tax was paid under protest and appeal taken from the ruling of'the Commissioner of Revenue.
2277 U. S. 148, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928).
'52 Sup. Ct. 546 (1932). (1932) 41 YALa L. J. 1237. The Fox case is
followed in Com. v. Hannaford, 165 S. E. 512 (Va. 1932).
'52 Sup. Ct. 546, 548 (1932). The court might have distinguished this tax
from Long v. Rockwood in the manner of the North Carolina court's distinction between the Chemical Construction case and Educational Films Corp.
v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400 (1931), i.e., the distinction between an income tax and a privilege tax measured by income. However, the distinction between franchise and income taxation might be offset in
statute-healing properties by the difference between gross receipts and income
as measures of the tax.
'(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115; (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 1100; (1929) 13
M
Qui-= L. REv. 117; (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 475. In the latter note the
opinion was expressed that inasmuch as Long v. Rockwood was a five to four
decision, the changed personnel of the judiciary might result in a court which
disapproved the authority the North Carolina court felt compelled to follow.
Strangely enough, there was no dissent in the Fox Film case. Van Devanter,
vtcReynolds, and Butler, JJ., who with Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Mr. Justice
Sanford formed the Long v. Rockwood majority, acquiesced in the overturning of that case.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
of decision in the Fox Film case, that a nondiscriminatory tax on the
-income from copyrights is not a tax upon any governmental function.
More important is the ascendency, though in a restricted measure,
-of the philosophy that powers and immunities, once thought to be

absolute, must be considered with regard to their effect.
Of incidental interest here, is the provision in the North Carolina

Revenue 'Act which imposes a flat rate license tax on persons engaged in the business of selling patent rights.6 Assuming this to
mean patent rights granted by the United States, what is the constitutional status of the tax? 7 Both this tax and that involved in
the Fox Film case are privilege taxes, but with the difference that
the flat rate may be more burdensome than a gross receipts levy.
Under the absolute immunity theory of Long v. Rockwood this tax
should have been invalid. Though flat rate taxation often is iniquitous, this license, since small in amount, would likely be countem-anced under the Court's present view.
E. M. PERKINS.
Trusts--Distinction Between Dividend and Coupon Funds.
The increasing burden imposed on the courts of adjudicating the
-various conflicting claims of creditors of insolvent corporations provokes serious inquiry as to the universally recognized distinction between a fund created to meet bond interest and a similar fund
created to meet declared dividends.1 The repeated efforts of the

I N. C.CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §7880 (94). "Every person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of selling or offering for sale any patent right
or formula shall apply in advance and obtain from the Commissioner of Revenue a separate State license for each and every county in this State where
such patent right or formula is to be sold or offered for sale, and shall pay
for each separate license a tax of ten dollars ($10.00). Counties, cities, or
-towns may levy a license tax on the business taxed under this section not in
,excess of the taxes levied by the State."
I A similar tax has been found in every Revenue Act since 1913, but so far
as can be determined it has not been judicially construed in North Carolina.
See, holding like statutes unconstitutional, Commonwealth v. Petty, 96 Ky.
452, 29 S. W. 291 (1895) ; In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. 833 (C. C. Ky. 1894).
'In Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, 288 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923) the court said: "There seems to be a fundamental distinction between a
fund set apart for the payment of a dividend and a fund set apart for the
:payment of ordinary indebtedness". In Guidise v. Island Refining Corporation, 291 Fed. 922 (S.D. N. Y. 1923) Judge Learned Hand declared, "I
.annot conceive any legal distinction between a fund deposited in a bank to
meet a declared dividend and called a 'Dividend Account,' and a similar fund
-deposited to meet coupons and called a 'Coupon Account'. A declared dividend
is universally regarded as a debt, and a coupon is of course no more than a
secured debt. How it can be thought, ceteris paribus, that one account should

